

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 IO-10 SAJ-01 ISO-00 ACDA-05 CIAE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5938

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, RO

SUBJECT: ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY: CEAUSESCU'S YEAR-END REVIEW.

1. SUMMARY. CEAUSESCU'S DECEMBER 18 SPEECH WAS HIS MOST IMPORTANT  
FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT SINCE THE NOVEMBER 1974 ELEVENTH PARTY  
CONGRESS AND ONE OF FEW TIMES HE HAS USED GRAND NATIONAL  
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ASSEMBLY FORUM TO UNDERLINE ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR ENTIRE

NATION (NOT JUST PARTY). CEAUSESCU MADE NO MAJOR DEPARTURES FROM ESTABLISHED ROMANIAN POLICY LINES, AND THE REGIME'S COMMITMENT TO PARTY AND STATE INDEPENDENCE FROM SOVIET CONTROL SEEMED FIRMLY REITERATED. CEAUSESCU GAVE MOSCOW SOME RATHER WISH-WASHY ASSURANCES THAT ROMANIA'S COOLNESS TOWARD BLOCS, BALKAN COOPERATION ACTIVITIES, AND FLIRTATION WITH THE NON-ALIGNED SIGNIFIES NO SINISTER GOR INTENTIONS TOWARD PACT COMMITMENTS. SPEECH WAS VIGOROUS IF UNDRAMATIC CORRECTIVE TO WARSAW PACT FONMINS' COMMUNIQUE, GIVING CEAUSESCU CHANCE TO SPELL OUT ROMANIA'S INDIVIDUALIST INTERPRETATIONS.

HE CAME DOWN FIRMLY AT LAST IN ANGOLAN MPLA'S CAMP, REASSERTED THE RCP'S AUTONOMOUS POLICY IN ECPC PREPARATIONS AND COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, AND TOOK AN OBLIQUE POT-SHOT AT U.S. UNITED NATIONS TACTICS. CEAUSESCU BALANCED CRITICISM OF ISRAEL'S ME POLICIES WITH INDIRECT CALL FOR PLO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. SPEECH ALSO SAW FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE OF POLEXCO MEMBER EMIL BODNARAS SINCE MARCH 1975.

2. DOMINATION AND DIKTAT. CEAUSESCU'S CHIEF CONCLUSION IN 1975 YEAR-END REVIEW OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY WAS THAT EVENTS HAVE FURTHER WEAKENED OLD ORDER OF "DOMINATION AND DIKTAT" -- AS MUCH IN RELATIONS BETWEEN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES AS IN THIRD WORLD. (AND BY IMPLICATION IN SOVIETS' BACKYARD AS WELL).

PERHAPS MORE CLEARLY THAN EVER, CEAUSESCU REVEALED HIS CONVICTION THAT IT IS BY RIDING THE WHIRLWIND OF INTERNATIONAL CHANGE AND SLANTING ROMANIAN POLICY AND IDEOLOGY TOWARD THIRD-WORLD THAT ROMANIA CAN BEST SECURE HER INDEPENDENCE FROM SOVIET HEGEMONY.

3. WARSAW PACT. AS HE DID IN SPEECH TO ARMY'S PARTY ACTIVISTS ON DECEMBER 10, CEAUSESCU FELT OBLIGED TO GIVE SIGNAL OF REASSURANCE TO MOSCOW ABOUT ROMANIA'S PACT INTENTIONS IN, WE EXPECT A DIRECT RESPONSE TO SOVIET CRITICISM WITHIN PACT COUNCILS. CEAUSESCU ASSERTED THAT AFTER DISSOLUTION OF BLOCS, ROMANIA INTENDS TO CONTINUE COLLABORATION WITH ARMIES OF FORMER PACT PARTNERS. HOWEVER, HE WATERED THIS DOWN WITH QUALIFICATION THAT ON NATIONAL BASIS ROMANIA IS GOING TO COLLABORATE ALSO WITH ARMIES OF NON-PACT SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND ALL HER OTHER FRIENDS

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AS WELL, WHICH MUST BE SCANT COMFORT TO THE KREMLIN. HE UNDERLINED -- ALSO FOR SOVIET AND THIRD-WORLD BENEFIT -- THAT THERE WAS NOTHING UNNATURAL IN ROMANIA SEEKING TO "PERFECT ITS RELATIONS" WITH NON-ALIGNED CAMP AND REMAINING A MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT -- "AS LONG AS IT EXISTS". CEAUSESCU AFFIRMED ROMANIA'S DESIRE TO BE AN OBSERVER AT NON-ALIGNED ACTIVITIES. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS SUCCEEDED IN GETTING ROMANIA'S SIGNATURE ON A PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE DECEMBER 16 WHICH

ENDORSED THE "DYNAMIC AND CONSISTENT POLICY OF SOCIALIST STATES" (IN PREVIOUS SUCH DOCUMENTS, THE PHRASE "CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES" OR "CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS" HAS BEEN USED), CEAUSESCU'S SPEECH AVOIDED ANY REFERENCE TO COLLECTIVITY IN EASTERN EUROPE AT ALL, AND RESORTED TO THE ALMOST PATHETIC EXAMPLE OF 44 PERCENT OF ROMANIA'S TRADE BEING WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO ILLUSTRATE GOOD INTENTIONS TOWARD PARTNERS.

4. CEMA. ALTHOUGH SUPERFICIALLY POSITIVE TOWARD CEMA, CEAUSESCU'S REMARKS BASED ANY "IMPROVEMENT" OF CEMA ON EQUALIZING DEVELOPMENT GAP BETWEEN MEMBERS AND ON PRINCIPLES IN 1971 COMPLEX PROGRAM ENSURING NATIONAL (NOT CEMA) PLANS.

CEAUSESCU GAVE BILATERAL CEMA TIES AS MUCH STRESS AS MULTILATERAL ONES AND UNDERLINED THAT ROMANIA DOES BUSINESS WITH MANY SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OUTSIDE CEMA (THIS, ACCORDING TO SCINTEIA ECONOMIC SPECIALIST, IN OPPOSITION TO SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO MAKE CEMA A TIGHTER, MORE CLOSED SYSTEM WITH ROMANIA INSIDE).

5. COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. CEAUSESCU'S FIRM LINE ON PARTY INDEPENDENCE VARIED LITTLE FROM PAST STATEMENTS. HE GAVE NEARLY AS MUCH BILLING TO UNITY AND SOLIDARITY BETWEEN CP'S AND "SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, SOCIALISTS, NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, GOVERNMENT PARTIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES" AS TO COMMUNIST UNITY PER SE. HE REITERATED ROMANIA'S INSISTENCE THAT "NEW TYPE" OF INTER-COMMUNIST RELATIONS AVOID "ANY AGGRAVATION OF DIVERGENCIES", ANY USE OF "DEAD DOGMA" AND "IMMUTABLE SCHEMAS", AND "DIRECTING CENTER" MEANT TO "COORERNATE" THE MOVEMENT, ANY "SLOGANS AND BLAMING" WHICH MIGHT DAMAGE UNITY AND ANY INTERFERENCE IN AFFAIRS OF OTHER PARTIES. HE URGED (AGAIN) RESPECT FOR CP DIVERSITY AND FOR "POSITIONS AND INTERESTS" OF INDIVIDUAL CP'S, RIGHT OF EACH PARTY TO SET ITS OWN LINE, NEED TO MAINTAIN COMRADELY TONE IN PARTY-TO-PARTY DISCUSSIONS, FULL CP EQUALITY, AND DUE ACCOUNT FOR SPECIFIC LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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HISTORICAL, NATIONAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF EACH PEOPLE. IN ROMANIA'S VIEW, OF COURSE, THE CPSU IS THE CONGENITAL VIOLATOR OF ALL ABOVE POINTS. CEAUSESCU GAVE SPECIAL SALUTE TO "CERTAIN WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES" WHICH HAVE

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R 191130Z DEC 75

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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

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SOUGHT TO FIND NEW FORMS SUITABLE TO CHANGED CONDITIONS;  
"NEW REALITIES, NEW TASKS AND OBJECTIVES" OF THE MOVEMENT WAS  
HIS LEITMOTIF. ON ECPC, CEAUSESCU CHOSE ONLY TO UNDERLINE  
NEED FOR "DEMOCRATIC" CP MEETING, NO OBLIGATORY  
DECISIONS FULL EQUALITY OF PARTICIPATION, DEBATE OPEN TO ALL  
INTERESTED PARTIES, AND FREE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS IN SPIRIT OF  
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RECIPROCAL ESTEEM AND RESPECT.

6. ANGOLA. CEAUSESCU PUT ROMANIA MORE SOLIDLY IN MPLA'S  
CAMP THAN BEFORE AND DID AWAY WITH MUCH OF THE AMBIGUITY  
SURROUNDING GOR'S ATTITUDE. HE SALUTED "RELATIONS OF

COLLABORATION" WITH "ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT CREATED BY MPLA, LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE". ON DECEMBER 19, SCINTEIA ANNOUNCED THAT ROMANIA AND PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA (PRA) HAVE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT EMBASSY LEVEL. CEAUSESCU EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER "INTERVENTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS" IN ANGOLA AND CALLED FOR CESSATION OF "ANY KIND OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION" (WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CUBANS AND SOVIETS). HE DID NOT IN FACT USE IN HIS BROADCASTED SPEECH THE SPECIFIC MENTION (IN THE DECEMBER 19 SCINTEIA TEXT) OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS, AND CALLED FOR THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE TO SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS ALONE. WARSAW PACT FONMIN COMMUNIQUE GOT ROMANIA'S BLESSING FOR "FIRM SUPPORT" OF PRA, FURTHER RATIFYING GOR'S VOLTE FACE.

7. MIDDLE EAST. CEAUSESCU SOUGHT TO MAINTAIN HIS ME BALANCING ACT BY SEVERELY CRITICIZING ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE TO MEET WITH PLO, AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S RECENT AIR ATTACKS IN LEBANON; HOWEVER, HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT GOR POLICY BASED ON PRINCIPLE THAT "A PEOPLE CAN'T BE FREE WHICH DOESN'T RECOGNIZE THE LIBERTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF OTHER PEOPLES", AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO PLO'S REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. IN ADDITION, IN A RARE REMARK CRITICAL OF UN AND CLEARLY REFERRING TO ANTI-ZIONISM RESOLUTION, CEAUSESCU OBSERVED THAT UN HAD ADOPTED SOME UNJUST DECISIONS AND MEASURES WHICH CONTRADICTED SPIRIT OF THE CHARTER.

8. CSCE. CEAUSESCU AGAIN EMPHASIZED UNITARY CHARACTER OF HELSINKI DOCUMENTS AND HIS INTENTION TO CARRY OUT CSCE DECISIONS. HE CALLED FOR MORE CONCRETE REALIZATION OF BASKET II ACCORDS, BUT REVERTED TO HIS CHARACTERIZATION OF BASKET II AS ENCOMPASSING BROAD RANGE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS DRUG ADDICTION, VIOLENCE, PORNOGRAPHY, HATEFUL PROPAGANDA AND RACISM. HE NOTED THE NEED, "IN SPIRIT OF DOCUMENTS ADOPTED AT HELSINKI", FOR A BETTER AND MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF WHAT IS MEANT BY "HUMANISM".

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9. BALKAN COOPERATION. CARAMANLIS PROPOSAL WAS AGAIN STRONGLY SUPPORTED AND RESPONDING TO 1971 SOVIET ALLEGATIONS OF "ANTI-RUSSIAN" BALKAN AXIS, CEAUSESCU DENIED THAT BALKAN COOPERATION WAS "DIRECTED AGAINST ANYONE OR COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO ANY COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES."

10. UNITED NATIONS. CEAUSESCU SHARPENED SOMEWHAT ROMANIA'S TRADITIONAL ACCENT ON "DEMOCRATIZATION" AND "EQUALITY" OF UN'S CHARTER AND STRUCTURE, HIGHLIGHTING SELECTIVELY POINTS FROM RECENT ROMANIAN UN DOCUMENT IN LINE WITH GOR'S UNDERLYING CONVICTION THAT THIRD WORLD'S UN STEAMROLLER CAN BE MANIPULATED TO GIVE ROMANIA GREATER PROTECTION AGAINST GREAT-POWER (SOVIET)

PRESSURES. CEAUSESCU CALLED FOR ENLARGEMENT OF UN BODIES, SPECIFICALLY SECURITY COUNCIL, A GREATER VOICE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM COUNTRIES, AND CHARTER REVISION TO REFLECT CHANGES OF PAST 30 YEARS. HE CLARIFIED ROMANIA'S STAND TO VETO, STOPPING SHORT OF CONDEMNING EXISITING SC VOTING PROCEDURE BUT URGING VETO BE LIMITED TO "EXCEPTIONAL CASES" IN DEFENSE OF PEACE AND SECURITY AND GRANTED TO TEMPORARY SC MEMBERS. HE MADE NO MENTION OF UN "PROPOSALS OF SOCIALIST STATES", WHICH WARSAW PACT FONMIN COMMUNIQUE STRESSED. CEAUSESCU EVINCED CONSIDERABLE DISQUIET OVER AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN'S TACTICS. ALTHOUGH NOT MENTIONING HIM BY NAME, HE CLAIMED "CERTAIN VOICES" WERE CRITICIZING THE UN "FROM NEGATIVIST POSITIONS", DISPLEASED WITH RECENT UN RESOLUTIONS, AND EVEN CALLING FOR THE UN'S "LIQUIDATION" (SIC). CEAUSESCU DECRINED "NEGATIVE ATTITUDES" TOWARD THE UN'S NEW MAJORITY AND ANY ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN ORGANIZATION.

11. PARLIAMENTS. CEAUSESCU PUT MORE WEIGHT THAN BEFORE ON USE OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTACTS, IN IPU AND THROUGH ROMANIAN GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, IN ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, AND GNA DECEMBER 19 APPROVED AN APPEAL ADDRESSED TO ALL CSCE PARLIAMENTS URGING THEM TO TAKE NEW ACTION TO BRING ABOUT MEANINGFUL AND EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT. QUOTING LENIN, HE CRITICIZED "SECRET DIPLOMACY", REFLECTING ROMANIA'S CHRONIC ASPERITY TOWARD US-SOVIET DEALS, ESPECIALLY MBFR PROCEDURES.  
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